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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Wolman v. Walter' raises
again the question whether the "final page" has been written with
respect to a troublesome period in the constitutional development of
religion clause2 principles. The United States Supreme Court has now
addressed itself to a complete array of state aid programs designed to.
assist pupils attending church-sponsored educational institutions.
After thirty years of intensive litigation the slate looks something like
this:
Programs in Conformity Programs Violative of
Year with First Amendment First Amendment
1947 School bus transportation 3
1968 Textbook loans4
1970 Real property tax exemp-
tion for religious organiza-
tionss
1971 Federal construction Salary supplements for lay teachers7
grants for church-related
colleges6  Secular education service contracts
calling for state to pay nonpublic
school for providing secular educa-
tion!
*Member, Ohio Bar. Mr. Young is a member of the firm of Dunbar, Kienzle & Murphey,
Columbus, Ohio. The author argued Wolman v. Walter before the United States Supreme
Court for appellees.
1. 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." U.S. CoNsTr. amend. I. The religion clause comprises two parts: the
establishment clause prohibits the government from promoting religion and the free exercise
clause prohibits the government from inhibiting religion.
3. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
5. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
6. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
7. Lemon v. Kurtzman [Early v. DiCenso], 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Early was a case arising
out of Rhode Island that was consolidated with the Pennsylvania case, Lemon %. Kurtzman,
for purposes of appeal).
8. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Pennsylvania statute declared unconstitu-
tional).
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1973 Tax-exempt bond assis- Grants to schools for cost of general
tance for construction at testing and record-keeping
t
church-related colleges9
Tuition reimbursement for low in-
come parents"
Parental tax credits
1
Grants to schools for maintenance
and repair"
Parental reimbursement grants 2
1975 Instructional equipment and mate-
rial loaned to schools'3
On-premises health and remedial
services1
3
1976 Direct, per-student grants
to church-related colleges
1 4
1977 Standardized tests and Instructional equipment and mate-
scoring services' 5  rial loaned to pupil 5
Speech and hearing diag- Field trip transportation'
nostic services"
Physician, dental and op-
tometric services
1?
Neutral-site therapeutic ser-
vices1
5
Neutral-site remedial edu-
cation services15
Programs for handi-
capped
15
Neutral-site guidance and
counseling1
5
Assistance grants for stu-
dents attending church-
related colleges1
In its 1976 decision in Roemer v. Board of Public WorksP the
Supreme Court intimated that the end of the line was near:
[T]he slate we write on is anything but clean. Instead, there is little room
9. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
10. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
11. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
12. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
13. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
14. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
15. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
16. Americans United for Separation of Church and State ,. Blanton, 433 F. Supp. 97
(M.D. Tenn. 1977), aff'd mem., 98 S. Ct. 39 (1977).
17. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
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for further refinement of the principles governing public aid to church-
affiliated private schools. Our purpose is not to unsettle those principles
...or to expand upon them substantially, but merely to insure that
they are faithfully applied in this case.'8
Similarly in Wolman, Justice Blackmun observed: "Nonetheless, the
Court's numerous precedents 'have become firmly rooted, . . .' and
now provide substantial guidance." 9 Justice Stewart, the author of
the majority opinion in Meek v. Pittenger," saw himself as applying
tests which constituted a distillation of the past decades of effort:
These tests constitute a convenient, accurate distillation of this
Court's efforts over the past decades to evaluate a wide range of gov-
ernmental action challenged as violative of the constitutional prohibition
against laws "respecting an establishment of religion," and thus provide
the proper framework of analysis for the issues presented in the case be-
for us.2 r
Notwithstanding these assurances by the Court that this area of
the law is settled, the question still remains: has the thoughtful schol-
arship of the Supreme Court's most respected Justices provided a
framework that will avoid continued controversy? This article will
show that they have not. Despite the strong assertions in recent de-
cisions by the Court that religion clause principles are well defined,
the fact is that there have been periodic major shifts in the factors
the Court considers in judging the constitutionality of a state aid pro-
gram. These shifts have had a divisive impact on the Court. In re-
cent years this division has resolved itself into a three-way split. This
article attempts to identify the current trend of the Court in state aid
cases by analyzing this split and the recent movement of the swing
group of Justices.
II. CHARTING A NEUTRAL COURSE BETWEEN THE FREE EXERCISE
AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES-THE TRIPARTITE
SPLIT IN THE COURT
Two issues must be addressed any time a state aid program is
presented to the Court. The first, which may be called the establish-
ment issue, is raised by opponents of state aid to sectarian schools.
The argument is that such aid constitutes a prohibited "establishment
of religion," or at least the first step toward such an establishment.
The second issue, which may be called the free exercise issue, is
advanced by proponents of the state assistance program. The pro-
ponents feel that since they pay education taxes a portion of the tax
18. Id. at 754.
19. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593, 2599 (1977).
20. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
21. Id. at 358.
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proceeds should be used to help finance their children's education.
Without an allocation of tax funds toward the education of their chil-
dren, they are forced either to bear the financial burden of paying twice
for their children's education-once through taxes and once through tui-
tion-or to send their children to the public school. This, proponents
assert, restricts their freedom of choice and inhibits their "free exer-
cise" of religion.
In an attempt to reconcile the constitutional conflict between the
establishment and free exercise clauses the Court developed a three-
part test for judging the various state programs. "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion
; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.' ,22
Careful analysis reveals that the relative significance of the es-
tablishment clause and the free exercise clause in first amendment
cases is sometimes ignored. Justice Brennan, who now maintains
that almost all forms of assistance to pupils at church-related schools
is violative of the establishment clause, recognized a place for the
free exercise doctrine in his concurring opinion in Abington School
District v. Schempp:
23
Attendance at the public schools has never been compulsory; par-
ents remain morally and constitutionally free to choo;e the academic en-
vironment in which they wish their children to be educated. The rela-
tionship of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
public school system is preeminently that of reserving such a choice to
the individual parent, rather than vesting it in the majority of voters of
each State or school district. The choice which is thus preserved is be-
tween a public secular education with its uniquely democratic values,
and some form of private or sectarian education, which offers values of
its own. In my judgment the First Amendment forbids the State to in-
hibit that freedom of choice by diminishing the attractiveness of either al-
ternative-either by restricting the liberty of the private schools to incul-
cate whatever values they wish, or by jeopardizing the freedom of the
public schools from private or sectarian pressures. The choice between
these very different forms of education is one-very nuch like the choice
of whether or not to worship-which our Constitution leaves to the in-
dividual parent. It is no proper function of the state or local government
to influence or restrict that election. 4
In spite of his recognition of free exercise values, Justice Brennan
has been unwilling to concede that placing a condition-attendance at
the public schools-upon a gratuitous state benefit can discourage the
free exercise of religion by "diminishing the attractiveness" of the
22. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citation omitted),
23. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
24. Id. at 242 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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church-related school. Such an attitude toward free exercise objec-
tives led to Chief Justice Burger's plea:
One can only hope that, at some future date, the Court will come to a
more enlightened and tolerant view of the First Amendment's guarantee
of free exercise of religion, thus eliminating the denial of equal protec-
tion to children in church-sponsored schools, and take a more realistic
view that carefully limited aid to children is not a step toward establish-
ing a state religion-at least while this Court sits.2
The Court's difficulty with this perplexing question has been ag-
gravated by its necessity of fashioning majority votes on a patchwork,
case-by-case basis. The opinion of the Court in Walz v. Tax Commis-
sio? 6 reflects the difficulty encountered in attempts to fashion sweep-
ing religion clause principles:
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amend-
ment are not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution.
The sweep of the absolute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have
been calculated; but the purpose was to state an objective, not to write
a statute. In attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religion
Clauses, the Court's opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formu-
lating general principles on a case-by-case basis. The considerable in-
ternal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in
retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these
clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have
limited meaning as general principles.
The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two
Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other. pe
In an amicus brief, Leo Pfeffer, who has argued a great number
of the religion clause cases before the Supreme Court of the United
States, described the past decades of constitutional history in this area
as a "historic game of chess." Although cases were won or lost and
governing principles seemed well defined, the fact is that the pieces
of the jigsaw puzzle were being "forced together."28 The compro-
mise, case-by-case approach utilized by the Court has misled both pro-
ponents and opponents of state assistance to nonpublic pupils and has
fostered continued litigation. Legislation was drafted in reliance on
sweeping utterances that in retrospect proved to be illusory.
In practice the tripartite test articulated by the Court does little
to balance the competing interests embodied in the two religion
clauses. The Court itself now speaks of the test only as a guide with
25. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 387 (1975).
26. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
27. Id. at 668-69.
28. Brief of National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty Amicus Curiae
at 10, Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. CL 2593 (1977).
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which to identify instances in which the objectives of the establish-
ment clause have been impaired. This tripartite test, however, serves
more as a framework for structuring opinions than as a guidepost for
determining the outcome. The objectives of the establishment clause,
likewise, are too vague to be outcome-determinative. An analysis
and understanding of the three-way split among the Supreme Court
Justices, 29 however, may be more productive in predicting whether a
given aid program will withstand religion clause challenge. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and White seem prepared to
approve a broad range of meaningful child benefit programs in the
form of grants, credits, scholarships, loans, and vouchers. 30  On the
other hand, it is with a great deal of reluctance that Justices Brennan.
Marshall, and Stevens approve even health-related services." The
middle is comprised of Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stewart, and
the outcome of future constitutional challenges will depend on the
direction in which they lean.32
29. The tension among the members of the Court is perhaps not fully revealed by the opin-
ions themselves. The depth and intensity of these tensions may very well stand currently as a
barrier to the formation of a predictable and stable five-Justice coalition, This internal tension
is explainable in part by the frustration that must flow from the Court's apparent inability to
formulate a comprehensive analysis in this troublesome area, and alo by the compromises re-
quired to obtain five votes. The internal tension is also a natural by-product of a case-by-case
legislative approach that has backfired because of a failure to conider fully the implications
of pronouncements in a given case upon future challenges.
The tension and frustration within the Court is undoubtedly agravated by the fact that
the Court has had to make decisions that vitally affect the inculcation of religious belief, the
extension of knowledge, and the education of children on the basis of abbreviated stipulations
of fact, facial challenges, or evidentiary transcripts that barely pierze the surface of relevant
educational and religious developments. The difficulties arising from inadequate factual develop-
ment are further compounded by the lack of historical record or legislative history with respect
to the religion clause. There were no public schools when the first amendment was adopted,
and the structure of American education has changed markedly since then. The religion clause
preceded general acknowledgment of the need for universal formal education. See Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). Thus, the Court for decades has been forced into a situation
of attempting to apply vaguely defined principles to an ever-shifting set of circumstances and
considerations from which it has not yet been able to extricate itself,
30. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977) (Burger, C.J. and White and
Rehnquist, JJ., voted to uphold all six categories of aid presented to the Court); Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (Burger, C.J., and White anid Rehnquist, JJ., voted to
uphold direct, per-student grants to church-related colleges); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975) (Burger, C.J., and White and Rehnquist, JJ., voted to uphold all three types of aid
presented to the Court).
31. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ,, voted
to strike down all six categories of aid presented to the Court; Stevens, J, voted to strike
down four categories of aid and to uphold diagnostic and therapeutic services, the latter two
with "misgivings"); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 f1976)(Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens, JJ., voted to strike down direct, per-student grants to church-related colleges),
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., voted to strike down all
three types of aid presented to the Court).
32. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977) (Blackmun and Stewart, JJ., voted
to uphold four of the six categories of aid presented to the Court ani to strike down loans of
instructional material and field trip transportation; Powell, J., voted to uphold five categories
and to strike down loans of instructional material); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S.
736 (1976) (Blackmun and Powell, JJ., voted to uphold and Stewart, J., voted to strike down
direct, per-student grants to church-related colleges); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S, 349 (1975)
(Stewart, Powell, and Blackmun, JJ., voted to uphold textbook loans and to strike down loans
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In order to appreciate the current alignment of the Justices and
the state of the law after Wolman it is necessary to consider the his-
torical positions of the Court. It is important to note that prior to
1971 the Court generally affirmed state aid to church-related schdols.
In that year the Court abruptly shifted its position regarding aid to
elementary and secondary schools. Now, after Wolman, it appears
that the Court is swinging back toward approval of some programs.
3
This article focuses on these swings and pays particular attention to
the pivotal cases Walz v. Tax Commission34 and Wolman v. Walter.35
As will be seen, Walz marked the end of Supreme Court approval of
state aid to church-sponsored schools and began a period in which
every state program, with the exception of aid to sectarian colleges,
was struck down. Wolman is now the first case to turn away from the
strict position the Court has held since Walz.
III. PRE-Walz CRITERIA: SECULAR PURPOSE AND EFFECT
The first case to consider the relationship between state aid to
church-sponsored education and the religion clause was Everson v.
Board of Education.3 6  New Jersey had enacted a law that would
reimburse parents for the expense of busing their children to public
and parochial schools. The Everson Court said that "the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall
of separation between church and State.' ,37 The Court held that the
New Jersey program had not made the slightest breach in the wall of
separation. The Court further held that to prohibit the state from
extending general welfare benefits to all of its children would be to
violate the neutral position required by the first amendment.
38
Between 1947 and 1968 Everson stood as the leading case in the
religion clause field. The principles first set forth in Everson were
further refined during the two decades following its decision 9 and were
applied again to a nonpublic school aid case in the form of a two-part
purpose-and-effect test40 in Board of Education v. Allen:41
of instructional material and on-premises health and remedial services). Note that the positions
taken by these Justices have determined the holding of the Court.
33. For a graphic representation of the swings in the Court, see the chart in section I of this
article.
34. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
35. 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
36. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
37. Id. at 16.
38. Id. at 18.
39. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), which upheld the constitu-
tionality of Sunday sales prohibition laws; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). vhich
upheld the constitutional validity of programs permitting public schools to release students dur-
ing the school day who desire to attend off-premises religion courses.
40. The two-part test was first laid down in the context of a school prayer case, Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
41. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary
effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of
religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as
circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.' 2
In Allen the Court upheld a New York program whereby local
school boards loaned approved textbooks to all children, including
sectarian school students, in grades seven through twelve. Before
the Court was able to find "a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,' it was necessary
for the Court to declare that the "processes of secular and religious
training [in church-sponsored schools] are [not] so intertwined that
secular textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact in-
strumental in the teaching of religion. 44
The Allen Court's recognition of the valuable role played by non-
public education was obviously a key factor in the decision. Justice
White, writing for the majority, utilized language that greatly in-
creased the hope and expectations of proponents of aid to nonpublic
school pupils:
Underlying these cases, and underlying also the legislative judgments
that have preceded the court decisions, has been a recognition that pri-
vate education has played and is playing a significant and valuable role
in raising national levels of knowledge, competence, and experience.
Americans care about the quality of the secular education available to
their children. They have considered high quality education to be an in-
dispensable ingredient for achieving the kind of nation, and the kind
of citizenry, that they have desired to create. Considering this attitude,
the continued willingness to rely on private school systems, including
parochial systems, strongly suggests that a wide segzment of informed
opinion, legislative and otherwise, has found that those schools do an
acceptable job of providing secular education to their students. This
judgment is further evidence that parochial schools are performing,
in addition to their sectarian function, the task of secular education.45
Many nonpublic school parents, educators, and administrators
read Allen as saying that carefully drafted aid programs that have
the primary effect of aiding the secular educational functions in
their schools would satisfy establishment clause restraints. It is diffi-
cult to quarrel or find fault with this interpretation. This is obviously
why opponents of nonpublic school aid have sought repeatedly during
the past nine years to convince the Supreme Court that Allen should
be reversed. In recent years, however, the Court has given little
42. Id. at 243 (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 248.
45. Id. at 247-48.
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more than lip service to the Allen principles46 and has in fact emas-
culated its underpinnings. The two-part test has been accompanied by
a third ingredient that has proved dominant in recent cases.
IV. INTRODUCTION OF THE ENTANGLEMENT TEST-
THE IMPACT OF Walz v. Tax Commission
In 1970, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that has had
perhaps a greater impact upon the education cases than any case since
Everson. Walz v. Tax Commission47 questioned the constitutional
validity of real property tax exemptions for property used exclusively
for religious purposes. The plaintiff, a real property owner, sought an
injunction to prevent the granting of property tax exemptions to reli-
gious properties, arguing that such exemptions forced him to make a
contribution to religious bodies contrary to the establishment clause.
In determining the constitutional validity of such exemptions, the
Court looked to whether taxation or exemption occasioned a greater
degree of involvement between government and religion, thus evi-
dencing its concern with the amount of entanglement between secular
and sectarian interests. The Court commented in dictum: "Obviously
a direct money subsidy would be pregnant with involvement and, as
with most governmental grant programs, could encompass sustained
and detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory
or administrative standards."48 Although the Supreme Court had in
prior decisions showed a concern about the degree of involvement be-
tween government and religion, this dictum gave birth to a third and
separate constitutional test for judging religion clause cases. Now, in
addition to determining that the legislative purpose and effect of a
state program did not promote or inhibit religion, it became necessary
for a court to inquire whether the administration of the program
fosters "excessive government entanglement with religion.
" 49
The first state aid to nonpublic school statutes to be tested subse-
quent to Walz were the Pennsylvania statute considered in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,50 and the Rhode Island statute considered in the companion
case, Earley v. DiCenso.51 The Rhode Island statute called for a salary
supplement to lay instructors teaching secular subjects in the Rhode
Island parochial schools. The Pennsylvania statute called for a con-
tractual relationship between the nonpublic school and the state
under which the state reimbursed the nonpublic schools for providing
46. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
47. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
48. Id. at 675.
49. Id. at 674.
50. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
51. Id.
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teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified
secular subjects. Both statutes were declared violative of the first
amendment. Chief Justice Burger, who had authored the Walz opin-
ion, delivered the opinion of the Court in which the purpose and effect
test in Allen became a tripartite inquiry:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such
tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secu-
lar legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the statute
must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion. 
2
Both statutes passed the first prong of the tripartite inquiry; in
neither the Pennsylvania nor the Rhode Island statutes did the
Court find a nonsecular legislative purpose. The second inquiry,
whether the principal or primary effect of the statutes was one that
did not promote or inhibit religion, was a more difficult one for the
Court to answer. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that it was possible
for the legislatures of the respective states to identify secular aspects
of a church-sponsored education and to design restrictions to insure
that the state aid would benefit only the secular. The Court did not
decide, however, whether the specific safeguards in the Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island programs were sufficient to meet the primary effect
test. Instead the Court condemned the programs because of the
intrusiveness of the safeguards into the church-sponsored school:
"This kind of state inspection and evaluation of the religious content
of a religious organization is fraught with the sort of entanglement
that the Constitution forbids. It is a relationship pregnant with dangers
of excessive government direction of church schools and hence of
churches. 5
If meaningful assistance to the nonpublic educational sector
appeared dead as a result of the Lemon decision, Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist54 seemed to complete the process and
seal the coffin. The Supreme Court in Nyquist declared unconstitu-
tional, as violative of the establishment clause, direct grants to non-
public schools for maintenance and repair of school facilities and
equipment, tuition reimbursement to low income parents of children
attending nonpublic schools, and income tax relief to all such parents.
On the same day as Nyquist, the Court also announced Sloan v.
Lemon," which declared Pennsylvania's parental reimbursement
52. Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 620.
54. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
55. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
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grants unconstitutional, and Levitt v. Committee for Public Educa-
tion,56 which declared unconstitutional the New York statute provid-
ing state reimbursement to nonpublic schools for testing and record-
keeping. The cumulative impact of these decisions and that in Lemon
v. Kurtzman was to place those who would seek to draft legislation
providing nonpublic school assistance on the horns of a dilemma. If
they included safeguards and procedures to insure that the assistance
was limited to the secular aspects of nonpublic education, the re-
strictions would be classified as prophylactic contacts involving ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion. If the restrictions
were removed, the program would fail because of the absence of
assurance against advancement of religion.
Program safeguards and regulations were not the only kinds of
church-state "entanglements" envisioned by the Court. In addition
it saw a danger of "political divisiveness"'57 arising from the natural
inclination of nonpublic schools to lobby in the legislatures for addi-
tional funds. Although he recognized that political debate and dif-
ferences are normal and healthy manifestations of the democratic
system of government, Chief Justice Burger declared that political
division along religious lines was "one of the principal evils against
which the First Amendment was intended to protect."58 This test
seemed based upon the assumption that as more assistance became
available to nonpublic education, a greater demand would arise, and
this demand would inevitably lead to political division along religious
lines.
The negative attitude of the Supreme Court towards the "self-
perpetuating and self-expanding propensities"59 of state assistance
to pupils at church-related educational institutions is reflected in
Chief Justice Burger's belief that "[a] certain momentum develops in
constitutional theory, and it can be a 'downhill thrust' easily set
in motion but difficult to retard or stop."60 The Court was obviously
alarmed at the rapid step from Allen to Lemon and DiCenso. It was
willing to allow bus rides and textbooks, but saw the prospect of much
broader scale assistance when it looked at the teacher salary supple-
ment program in DiCenso and the educational contract program in
Lemon. The momentum was too much; the Court refused to adopt
the philosophy of Justice Harlan that "[it is always possible to shrink
from a first step lest the momentum will plunge the law into pitfalls
56. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
57. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 624.
60. Id.
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that lie in the trail ahead. I, for one, however, do not believe that a
'slippery slope' is necessarily without a constitutional toehold.'
The repressive constitutional doctrine that was based on a fear of
political divisiveness was spawned by the Court during its "momentum
blocking" stage of development. Chief Justice Burger's enunciation
of this doctrine in Lemon was surprising, if not shocking, in view of
fact that just one year earlier in Walz, he had espoused the right of
religious organizations and churches to take strong positions on public
issues without the slightest suggestion that this would disqualify their
adherents from participating in public benefits. The Chief Justice
had written:
Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently
take strong positions on public issues including, as this case reveals in
the several briefs amici, vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional
positions. Of course, churches as much as secular bodies and private
citizens have that right. No perfect or absolute separation is really pos-
sible; the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of
sorts-one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive entangle-
ment.
62
It is perhaps understandable that the Court was concerned by the
momentum that had gathered between Allen and Lemon; it is un-
fortunate, however, that the response between 1971 and 1975 was a
series of case-by-case compromises rather than the development of
constitutional principles of more lasting guidance. Beginning in 1971,
the Court began a cut and paste process in deciding how far the pro-
gram could proceed without reaching the verge of forbidden territory
under the religion clauses. It refused to accept the invitation of
opponents of such educational programs to declare them all violative
of the establishment clause. On the other hand, there seemed to be no
logical basis for distinguishing one program from the other. Sweeping
utterances, seemingly clear in one case, had to be altered to meet the
Court's attitudes concerning the verge of forbidden territory in another.
This seemed the result of judicial legislation. It was in recognition of
these problems that Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist noted that "[w]ithin the limits permitted
by the Constitution, these decisions are quite rightly hammered out on
the legislative anvil.,
63
Additional doctrines were developed by the Court that had the
effect of further emasculating the theoretical underpinnings of Allen.
The acceptance of dual and separable secular and religious roles in
nonpublic education was replaced with a presumption that these are
61. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 699-700 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
62. fd. at 670.
63. 413 U.S. 756, 813 (1973).
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"religious-pervasive institutions,"'' and that aid to the secular func-
tions of the schools cannot be separated from the religious functions.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in a later case, concluded:
[I]t would simply ignore reality to attempt to separate secular educa-
tional functions from the predominantly religious role performed by many
of Pennsylvania's church-related elementary and secondary schools
and to then characterize Act 195 as channeling aid to the secular with-
out providing direct aid to the sectarian. Even though earmarked for
secular purposes, "when it flows to an institution in which religion is so
pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in
the religious mission," state aid has the impermissible primary effect
of advancing religion.9
V. DISSENTERS' REACTION TO THE HARSH IMPACT
OF Lemon AND Nyquist
The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Nyquist reveals
that the entanglement test, which he set forth in Walz and expanded
in Lemon, had in Nyquist gone much further than he had anticipated.
It was being utilized to bar forms of assistance that he felt provided
benefits to children rather than churches and thus met constitutional
standards. The tolerant attitude expressed by Chief Justice Burger in
his Nyquist dissent may very well be attributable to a reconsideration
of the potential tensions between the establishment and free exercise
clauses. While commenting upon the application of the two clauses
the Chief Justice stressed free exercise principles: "[T]he balance
between the policies of free exercise and establishment of religion
tips in favor of the former when the legislation moves away from
direct aid to religious institutions and takes on the character of gen-
eral aid to individual families." 66 Chief Justice Burger also reflected
a different reaction to "momentum blocking' when he noted that
"[i]t is no more than simple equity to support partial relief to parents
who support the public schools they do not use."67
Justice White's dissent in Nyquist stated the free exercise argu-
ment even more forcibly:
Under state law these children have a right to a free public education
and it would not appear unreasonable if the State, relieved of the expense
of educating a child in the public school, contributed to the expense of
his education elsewhere. The parents of such children pay taxes, includ-
ing school taxes. They could receive in return a free education in the
public schools. They prefer to send their children, as they have the right
64. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973).
65. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365-66 (1975) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
743 (1973)).
66. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 802 (1973) (Burger, CJ., dissent-
ing).
67. Id. at 803.
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to do, to nonpublic schools that furnish the satisfactory equivalent of a
public school education but also offer subjects or other assumed advan-
tages not available in public schools. Constitutional considerations aside,
it would be understandable if a State gave such parents a call on the
public treasury up to the amount it would have cost the State to educate
the child in public school, or, to put it another way, up to the amount the
parents save the State by not sending their children to public school.
In light of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, this
would seem particularly the case where the parent desires his child to
attend a school that offers not only secular subjects but religious train-
ing as well. A State should put no unnecessary obstacles in the way of
religious training for the young. "When the state encourages religious
instruction ... it follows the best of our traditions."
' 8
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Nyquist reveals that he likewise would
have upheld the tuition reimbursement and tax relief provisions of the
New York statute in recognition of the "benevolent neutrality69 re-
quired in order to reconcile the tension between the free exercise and
establishment clauses. His dissent recognized that financial restraints
to free exercise exist when nonpublic school parents are compelled to
pay for their own children's education as well as support public school
services unused by them.
Notwithstanding the Chief Justice's shift in attitude and the
strength of the Rehnquist and White dissents, an even more extreme
and restrictive application of the tripartite test was made in the 1975
case Meek v. Pittenger.7" Meek struck down a program that involved
loaning equipment and providing health services to nonpublic schools.
It was the culmination of the era of persistent Supreme Court disapproval
of state aid to church-sponsored schools. Strangely, though, this disap-
proval did not extend to state aid to church-sponsored colleges. These
cases, by their contrast, illuminate the hostility the Court's majority
held toward religious education.
VI. APPROVAL OF STATE AID IN HIGHER EDUCATION CASES:
A RELIGION-EFFECTIVENESS TEST?
If a lawyer in 1971, after reviewing the Lemon opinion, were called
upon to opine as to the constitutionality of federal legislation providing
grants for the construction of buildings at church-related colleges, the
thrust of his opinion would be quite predictable. After reciting the
tripartite test, the lawyer would advise that it would be necessary to es-
tablish comprehensive restrictions in order to insure that the legislation
did not result in advancement of religion. Absent restrictions, the leg-
islation would fail the primary effect test because of the danger that the
68. Id. at 814 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Zorach v. Clauon, 343 U.S. 306. 313-14
(1952)).
69. Id. at 810 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). See notes 77-86 infra and accompanying text.
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mandated aid could be applied to a sectarian purpose. On the other
hand, if the legislation contained adequate restrictions it would fail
because of excessive government entanglement with religion. At least
this would be the likely content of the opinion if that lawyer had not
71
read Tilton v. Richardson, which was announced the same day as
Lemon. The tests and guiding principles read the same in Tilton as in
Lemon, but the same tests apparently have different meanings when
applied at different levels of education.
In sustaining the constitutionality of construction grants to church-
related colleges, the Court was impressed by the fact that churches are
less successful in the accomplishment of their religious missions in
colleges than in elementary or secondary schools: "There is substance
to the contention that college students are less impressionable and less
susceptible to religious indoctrination." 72  Although many of the
church-state cases relating to elementary and secondary education are
decided on the basis of an assumed composite profile of church-related
schools, the court in Tilton rejected that approach: "We cannot .. .
strike down an Act of Congress on the basis of a hypothetical 'pro-
file.' ,73 A comparison of Tilton and Lemon simply confirms the ad
hoc approach that has been used by the Court in this area of the law.
The Court seems more skeptical of the possibility of religious inculca-
tion in church-related colleges and thus more tolerant of aid programs
to them.
After approving federally funded construction grants to church-
related colleges in Tilton, the Supreme Court next approved a state
program for construction of church-related colleges with state-issued,
tax-exempt bonds in the case Hunt v. McNair.74 In Hunt the state-
created authority that issued the bonds would take title to the facility
and lease it back to the college, with reconveyance to the college upon
full repayment of the bonds. The Hunt decision was announced the
same day as Nyquist. The same words were used in describing the
tests but these words again were applied differently. The Court re-
fused to adopt a composite profile of the religious nature of post-
secondary institutions and differentiated the colleges from the church-
related elementary schools on the basis of the differing religious
character of the institutions.
Perhaps the most surprising of all of the recent higher education
cases was Roemer v. Board of Public Works. 75 The Court upheld a
Maryland statute that provided direct annual subsidies to church-re-
7.1. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
72. Id. at 686.
73. Id. at 682.
74. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
75. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
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lated colleges in an amount equal to fifteen percent of the state's ex-
penditure for students in state colleges. The Court again stressed the
secular functions of the religious colleges and the religious function of
church-related elementary and secondary schools.
Although colleges undoubtedly seek to accomplish their religious
goals differently from elementary and secondary schools, it is indeed
doubtful that a religious organization would sponsor and administer a
church-related college if it did not consider it to be part of its religious
missi6n. It seems obvious that the extent to which a religious organi-
zation is able to inculcate religious values or religious doctrine in stu-
dents attending its colleges varies from college to college. In a recent
case a district court in Tennessee observed:
It should be noted here that the evidence adduced established that
some, but not all, of the private schools [colleges] whose students bene-
fitted from this program are operated for religious purposes, with reli-
gious requirements for students and faculty and are admittedly permeated
with the dogma of the sponsoring religious organization. 6
The Supreme Court has purportedly refused to use composite pro-
files in higher education cases, but the truth is that it has used standard
profiles in evaluating the nonsecular nature of colleges, just as it did in
cases concerning aid to elementary and secondary schools. It assumes
as a general proposition that church-related colleges are not as effective
in their religious goals as elementary and secondary schools. Coupled
with the Court's assumption that elementary and secondary sectarian
schools are "religious-pervasive institutions," this presents a question
whether the Court is establishing a preferred religion based on the
effectiveness of its mission to inculcate religious values during the edu-
cation process.
The difficulty with such an analysis is that it acts as a restraint
upon the free exercise of religion. Simply put, the test seems to be that
an educational institution may receive a share of education tax dollars
only if it is ineffective in its religious mission. The trouble with this ap-
proach is that it places the Court in the position of making value judg-
ments as to the desirability and effectiveness of religious beliefs and
religious missions. The Court found a rationale to justify its compromise,
but it may again find that it has entered an extremely uncomfortable
thicket. This sort of evaluation of the "religion-effectiveness" of the in-
stitutions involved does not represent the neutrality that the free exer-
cise clause requires. When the Court approves direct state aid to a
Catholic college but denies a cultural field trip bus ride to a child at-
tending a Jewish grade school it is advancing one form of religious
activity and impeding another. Does this approach not establish a
76. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Blanton, 433 F. Supp, 97,
100 (M.D. Tenn. 1977), aff'd mem., 98 S. Ct. 39 (1977).
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Court-preferred method of teaching religion, and place financial ob-
stacles in the way of religious training that does not comply with the
Court's preference?
VII. STRANGLING ENTANGLEMENT-THE COURT'S SHIFT
FROM STRICT DISAPPROVAL TO BALANCING
It must be recalled that for some time before Wolman no state aid
to church-related elementary or secondary schools had been ap-
proved by the Court. The religion-effectiveness approach that appar-
ently emerged in the higher education cases indicated a hostility of the
Court towards effective religious education. The culmination of this
period of strict disapproval of elementary and secondary aid came in
the case Meek v. Pittenger."
In Meek the Court was presented with a state program that
loaned textbooks and instructional equipment and materials to the
schools and provided on-premises health and remedial service to the
students. Justice Stewart authored an opinion in Meek that brought
himself and his fellow swing Justices, Blackmun and Powell, together
in a coalition with the three Justices who were then most opposed to
state aid to parochial schools-Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall.
His effort to state principles that would be guiding or controlling in
future litigation, however, proved to be disastrous, as it brought inter-
nal tensions within the Court to a high point. Chief Justice Burger's
dissent contained a bitter and stinging rebuke, reflecting his conviction
that the Court was ignoring the free exercise clause and discriminat-
ing against children because of the exercise of religious choice by their
parents. He charged that the consequence of the Court's holding was
to "penalize institutions with a religious affiliation," to "affirmatively
stifle . . . religious activity," and to "penalize children . . . who
have the misfortune to have to cope with the learning process under
extraordinarily heavy physical and psychological burdens." Accord-
ing to the Chief Justice, the Meek ruling "literally turns the Religion
Clauses on their heads."
78
Insofar as the legislative program in Meek provided auxiliary
health and remedial services to nonpublic school children on the same
basis as public school children, the free exercise implications of exclud-
ing the nonpublic school children were apparent. Should a child be
denied an inherently secular diagnostic or remedial service simply be-
cause his parents had selected a church-related school? The Supreme
Court had already held that "no State may 'exclude individual Catho-
lics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-be-
lievers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of
77. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
78. I& at 386-87 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
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their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation.' ,79 Nevertheless, Justice Stewart stressed the establish-
ment rather than the free exercise clause when he concluded that the
services would be provided "in schools in which education is an inte-
gral part of the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere
dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly main-
tained."80 He found that the state would be required to engage in un-
constitutional surveillance to insure that a speech and hearing thera-
pist, hired and controlled by the local public school district, would not
sneak religion into speech therapy. It was obviously in response to
Chief Justice Burger's stinging rebuke that a footnote to Justice Stew-
art's opinion!' indicated that the Court did not challenge the right of
the state to make free auxiliary services available to all students in the
Commonwealth, including those who attended church-related schools.
The footnote, however, failed to specify the constitutionally accept-
able mechanism for providing such services to all children.
Meek reaffirmed Allen by upholding the constitutional validity of
the textbook aid, but declared the supply of instructional material and
equipment to be unconstitutional. The Court again justified this result
on the basis of the "predominantly religious character of the schools
benefiting from the Act. 82  A question arises, however, with respect
to this rationale because the Court recognized that the materials and
equipment were "self-polic[ing], in that starting as secular, nonideolog-
ical and neutral, they will not change in use."83 The Court did not ex-
plain how a secular piece of equipment that could not be used for
religious purposes would have the primary effect of advancing religion
in a church-related school. Neither did it explain how the lending of a
secular package of math cards advanced religion when a math textbook
containing the same information did not. Justice Rehnquist in his dis-
sent pointed out that "[o]nce it is conceded that no danger of diversion
exists, it is difficult to articulate any principled basis upon which to
distinguish the two Act 195 programs. 84 The extent to which the en-
tanglement test as enunciated in Walz had been expanded in Meek led
Justice Rehnquist to observe: "[A]ppellees are left to wonder, with
good reason, whether the possibility of meeting the entanglement test
is now anything more than 'a promise to the ear to be broken to the
hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will.' ,,8q
79. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
80. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 (1975).
81. Id. at 368 n. 17.
82. Id. at 363.
83. Id. at 365.
84. Id. at 391 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 394 (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941)(Jackson, J., con-
curring)).
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Justice Rehnquist also took the majority to task for "throwing
its weight" on the side of those who believe that society as a whole
should be secular rather than religious:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Be-
ing. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room
for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man
deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that
shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according
to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state
encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities
by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows
the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To
hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement
that the government shows a callous indifference to religious groups.
That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who
do believe. Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake
religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use
secular institutions to force one or some religion on any person. But we
find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for govern-
ment to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to
widen the effective scope of religious influence. 6
Since Meek had stretched the entanglement test beyond the break-
ing point and aggravated the inherent tension between the free exer-
cise and establishment clauses, it was inevitable that a case like Wol-
man v. Walter8 7 would follow on its heels. The Ohio legislation before
the Court in Wolman was drafted for the specific purpose of testing
the limits of Meek. It was suggested in Meek that some of the services
may have been constitutional but the Court refused to treat the legisla-
tion as being severable.88 The Ohio legislature sought to avoid having
the Court strike down its entire program by enacting twelve separate
categories of aid, in separately labeled paragraphs,89 specifically des-
ignated as independent and wholly severable. 0 The Supreme Court
acceded to the wishes of the legislature and treated the various aid
provisions as severable, sustaining nine sections while rejecting the
constitutionality of three.
The Wolman Court dealt with the various types of aid in separately
numbered portions of its opinion, and not all portions mustered the
same majority of the Justices. State aid categories approved by the
Court are (1) textbook loans to pupils,91 (2) standardized testing and
86. Id. at 395-96 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952)).
87. 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
88. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 n.21 (1975).
89. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(A)-(L) (Page Supp. 1976).
90. Id. § 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1976) states: "Moneys paid . . . shall be used for the fol-
lowing independent and fully severable purposes . ...
91. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593, 2599-600 (1977) (upheld by six Justices).
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scoring,92 (3) diagnostic services-speech, hearing, and psychological
testing-provided on premises by professional employees of the local
boards of education, 93 and (4) therapeutic services-speech, hearing,
and psychological therapy, and programs for emotionally disturbed
and handicapped children-provided off-premises by professional em-
ployees of the board of education.
94
Programs whose constitutionality were rejected are (1) loans to
pupils of instructional materials and equipment incapable of diversion
to religious use95 and (2) transportation for field trips that are the same
as those provided in public schools.
96
The Ohio statute sought to test the abuse of free exercise concepts
in Meek by calling for the remedial educational services, provided to
public school pupils, to be provided to nonpublic school pupils either
at a public school, a public center, mobile home or a similar neutral
site. Services less susceptible to the inculcation of religious beliefs such
as health and diagnostic services were to be provided in the nonpublic
school. It was difficult for the Court to ignore the free exercise implica-
tions of a denial of these services under such circumstances. Would the
Court label a nonpublic school pupil as a sectarian citizen even when he
was led off the school premises? Would the sectarian badge stand as a
barrier to the receipt of secular, neutral, and nonideological services
even in public facilities?
The plaintiffs in Wolman argued that even when nonpublic school
children were off school premises, they were "an identifiable sectarian
group," and that aid could not be provided to such a sectarian class.
Did such an argument mean that these children were identifiable sec-
tarian children when they went to the movies, when they went to a
grocery store, when they participated in dances with other children,
or when they went to a public library? The Supreme Court had al-
ready rejected programs that provided identical services to church-re-
lated school children at their school. The free exercise clause of the
first amendment would have become meaningless if the Court had held
that children must be denied therapeutic and remedial services by
public employees, under control of the local public school district, at
public facilities simply because they are registered pupils at church-
related schools. Although the Court again passed up the opportunity to
speak directly to the tension between the establishment and free exer-
cise clauses, it upheld the constitutional validity cf providing educa-
tional and therapeutic services at neutral sites and the constitutional
92. Id. at 2600-01 (upheld by six Justices).
93. Id. at 2601-03 (upheld by eight Justices).
94. Id. at 2603-05 (upheld by seven Justices).
95. Id. at 2605-07 (invalidated by six Justices).
96. Id. at 2608-09 (invalidated by five Justices).
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validity of providing health and diagnostic services at the church-
related school.
The Court in Wolman did not base its decision on free exercise
principles, but seemed to adopt Chief Justice Burger's child benefit
approach in noting that "[t]he dangers perceived in Meek arose from
the nature of the institution, not from the nature of the pupils."'
7
VIII. REALIGNMENT OF THE JUSTICES: A MORE PERMISSIVE
APPROACH TO NONPUBLIC SCHOOL AID
The Wolman decision was the first case since Allen in which the
Court upheld meaningful assistance to children attending church-
related elementary and secondary schools. Since the Wolman decision
allowed $88,800,000 per biennium to continue to flow under the Ohio
plan, it dispelled the notion created by Meek that any attempt to
provide substantial aid to nonpublic school children would be blocked.9"
Although the $88,800,000 per biennium assistance is of extreme im-
portance to children attending Ohio's nonpublic schools, the long-
range implications of Wolman in the continuing development of first
amendment principles relating to nonpublic school aid are of much
greater import. For one thing, the Wolman decision suggests that
Justice Powell is ready to join the Burger-Rehnquist-White voting
block. Justice Powelrs concurring opinion in Woiman reflects one of
the most enlightened views expressed in this troublesome consti-
tutional area.
Justice Powell noted that we have reached a point in the twentieth
century far removed from the dangers that prompted the framers to
include the establishment clause in the Bill of Rights. He argued that
the risk of religious control over democratic processes or deep political
divisiveness along religious lines was quite small when viewed against
the contributions of the sectarian schools. The following extract from
Justice Powell's concurring opinion indicates that Wolman does not
present the final word, and that properly drafted legislation providing
secular assistance to pupils rather than institutions may yet find a recep-
tive court:
Our decisions in this troubling area draw lines that often must
seem arbitrary. No doubt we could achieve greater analytical tidiness if
we were to accept the broadest implications of the observation in Meek
v. Pittenger . . . that "[s]ubstantial aid to the educational function
of [sectarian] schools . . . necessarily results in aid to the sectarian
enterprise as a whole." If we took that course, it would become impossible
to sustain state aid of any kind-even if the aid is wholly secular in char-
acter and is supplied to the pupils rather than the institutions. Meek
97. Id. at 2605.
98. Id. at 2610 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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itself would have to be overruled, along with Board of Education v. Allen,
... and even perhaps Everson v. Board of Education .... The per-
sistent desire of a number of States to find proper means of helping
sectarian education to survive would be doomed. This Court has not yet
thought that such a harsh result is required by the Establishment Clause.
Certainly few would consider it in the public interest. 99
Justice Powell would have approved field trip transportation under
the Ohio program and also a more restricted program of lending in-
structional materials and equipment to the pupils. This places him very
close conceptually to the position advanced by Chief Justice Burger
since 1973. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court100 in Wolman may
also be interpreted as setting the stage for a new approach in the area.
It approves programs calling for substantial assistance to elementary
and secondary school children, differentiates between children and the
religious school they attend, and places greatly reduced stress upon the
political divisiveness doctrine.
Those who saw Wolman as opening the door to a new and more
permissive approach to aid to nonpublic school programs found their
view supported by the October 3, 1977 Supreme Court affirmance of
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State v. Blanton.'
The legislation challenged in Blanton was a Tennessee program of as-
sistance grants for pupils at public and church-related colleges. The
three-judge district court sustained the Tennessee legislation on the
basis of the child benefit theory promulgated in Everson and Allen, and
on the basis of the "broad class of recipients" theory suggested in
Nyquist.10 2 Thus, precedent was found in the elementary and secon-
dary school cases. Although the three-judge district court in Blanton
did not specifically address the internal tension between the establish-
ment and free exercise clauses, it noted that the purpose of the Tennes-
see program was to "provide needy students with the opportunity to
attend the higher education institution of their cioice, be it public,
private, sectarian, or nonsectarian."10 3 It also reli-d to a substantial
degree upon the Supreme Court's dismissal of an appeal from a South
Carolina decision for want of a substantial federal question. The South
Carolina Supreme Court had approved a loan program to students
at public and nonpublic colleges.104 It sustained the legislation on the
grounds that it was "scrupulously neutral as between religion and ir-
religion and as between various religions."'
0 5
99. Id. at 2613 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 2597-609.
101. 433 F. Supp. 97 (M.D. Tenn. 1977), aff'd mem., 98 S. Ct. 39 (1977).
102. Id. at 102-03 (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)),
103. Id. at 105.
104. Durham v. McLeod, 259 S.C. 409, 192 S.E.2d 202 (1972), oppeal dismissed, 413 U.S.
902 (1973).
105. Id. at 413.
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Does the Court's affirmance of Blanton mean that legislative pro-
grams providing loans, grants, scholarships, vouchers or tax credits to
pupils at nonpublic educational institutions will be sustained if (1)
such benefits are provided to a broad base of recipients, (2) the grants
are to the pupils or their parents and not to the institutions, and (3)
the legislative program is scrupulously neutral with respect to religion?
Does the fact that Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens would have
noted probable jurisdiction in Blanton lend support to the theory
that Justices Powell, Stewart, and Blackmun are leaning more in the
direction of the Burger-Rehnquist-White bloc than in the direction of
the Brennan-Marshall-Stevens bloc? The answer to these questions
is not yet clear.
IX. CONCLUSION
Although the United States Supreme Court has now considered
constitutional challenges to almost every conceivable form of legisla-
tion providing assistance to nonpublic school pupils, it does not appear
that the final page has been written. The inherent tension between the
free exercise and establishment clauses remains. The slate is "anything
but clean" with respect to the criteria to be applied in future cases,
but the criteria leave substantial room for "play in the joints" and
new developments can be anticipated.
Public school financing is in a state of upheaval. Federal court
remedies ordered in racial desegregation cases have caused short-range
chaos. Some local school districts are uncertain whether to look to the
local property tax, state funding, or the federal courts for resolution
of their financial problems. School districts throughout the country
are embroiled in litigation challenging the constitutionality of their for-
mulae for public school financing. Public schools and nonpublic
schools in some states have joined hands to search for common solu-
tions.
Such joint efforts will undoubtedly look to decisions like Wolman
for guidance. Public schools may want to move in the direction of per-
pupil funding. Nonpublic schools would be well advised to concen-
trate upon child benefit assistance and upon legislation directed toward
a broad class of beneficiaries. Thus, joint solutions for financial prob-
lems confronting public and nonpublic schools may lie ahead. Although
these educational, financial, and constitutional problems are indeed
perplexing, thoughtful scholarship directed toward the internal tensions
in the first amendment between the establishment and free exercise
clauses may bring a firmly rooted solution.
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